India Peace Keeping Force, the Indian Army contingent, sent to Sri Lanka in July 1987, largely remains a distant memory. The force which numbered almost 100,000 jawans at its peak remained operational for almost three years and faced some of the harshest conditions known to man.
It is generally acknowledged that IPKF achieved its tactical goals with sweat and determination while lacking even basic support, like, maps of the operational area. The men and women of the force obeyed the orders to the letter, earned medals and lost friends.
Following is the writing about one of the first major operations in Sri Lanka by Brig. BK Khanna – reproduced with his kind permission.
Disclaimer: Writing and opinions shared are of Brig (Dr) BK Khanna, SM, VSM, alone and theindependent.in has not appended/added/edited the text provided to it.
LINK UP OPERATIONS WITH JAFFNA FORT IN SRI LANKA
by
Brig (Dr) BK Khanna, SM, VSM**
Background
5th Bn (Napiers) The Rajputana Rifles, one of the oldest battalion (Bn) of the Indian Army, in which I was commissioned after passing out from Academy on 24 April 1966 and I had the honor to command the same unit and take it to operations during OP PAWAN (Sri Lanka).
The battalion took part from the start of the ops against LTTE in Sri Lanka. It brought laurels for India, Indian Army, the Regiment and of course for itself, for its credible performance during its 14 months stay in the island. The unit had the unique distinction of being the first unit to ‘link up’ with Jaffna Fort.
The ‘paltan took part in innumerable operations in Northern and Eastern part of the Pearl Island, but the first and the most important of them was ‘Link up’ battle. During the peace keeping period (29 Jul 1987 to 08 Oct 1987), 1 MARATHA LI was located in Jaffna Fort. When the hostilities started between IPKF and LTTE in the second week of October 1987, the latter had besieged the Indian bn inside Jaffna Fort.
One of the first task of IPKF was to link up with the bn (hence the name ‘Link Up’) and then to flush out LTTE from its main stronghold – Jaffna Town.
LTTE Siege
LTTE had laid three eccentric rings of defence to siege the Jaffna Fort.
The ‘core’ ring was around the Jaffna Fort in high rise buildings, like Veerasingha Hall and Hotel Ashok. The ‘inner’ ring was in the heart of the town along all the arteries leading to Jaffna viz along Kokuvil, Thirunelvely, Nullur Temple and Chivacheri and the ‘outer ring was along Anaicottai, Manipay, Maruthananamadam, Urumpirai, Kopai and Navatkuli.
IPKF Outline Plan
IPKF launched three pronged attacks with a brigade each along KKS Road, Palali Road and Colombo Road. LTTE was able to hold IPKF thrusts along the ‘outer’ ring. At this juncture 41 Infantry Brigade was inducted in the Island. 5 RAJ RIF (Napiers Rifles) formed part of this Brigade.
41 Infantry Brigade Plan
41 Inf Bde was given the task of link up with 1 MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY in Jaffna Fort along the coast from West and capture Jaffna, developing operations from South to North. The original Bde plan was:-
a) Move to Firm Base from Palaley Airport (Induction point). . To advance along rd Mallakam – Maruthanamadam and contact 8 MAHAR at Uduvil.
b) Phase 1. ‘A’ Bn to clear area along western coast of Jaffna Lagoon and link ip with 1 MARATHA LI.
c) Phase 2. ‘B Bn was to follow advance of ‘A’ Bn and after link up to carry out ‘flush out’ ops inside Jaffna Town from South to North.
d) 5 RAJ RIF was earmarked as reserve for the whole operation and located in Maruthanamadam.
Preface
‘A’ Bn led the advance of the Brigade at 1600 hrs on 17 October 1987, skirting Manipai from NE. Going approximately one km, it was engaged by militants in a bowl and could not move further.
‘B’ Bn was given the choice to either link up with ‘A’ Bn and then resume advance or go along Manipai – Suthumalai – Jaffna Road and link up with 8 MAHAR Coy at Anaicottai, which had been airdropped there but were pinned down by the LTTE at dropping location itself.
‘B’ Bn chose first option. After link up with ‘A’ Bn, it also could not also make further progress. Hence both bns of the Brigade were stuck in the bowl approx one km from Uduvil. It was now 14 hrs since ‘A’ Bn had started operatios.
At this juncture, at 0400 hrs on 18 Oct 1987, 5 RAJ RIF was released to 41 Infantry Brigade for its operations.
Move from Maruthanamadam to Uduvil took two hours. At 0700 hrs on 18 Oct 1987, Commanding Officer (CO) met the Brigade Commander (Bde Cdr) and was apprised of the latest operational situation . The Cdr was reasonably upset when he briefed the CO as nothing was working as per plan. He informed that he had recommended to the Division that Napier’s Rifles should be landed at Mandaitivu Island (one kilometer south of Jaffna Fort) and link up with 1 MARATHA LI via the causeway.
The other plan was to advance with one rifle company(coy) from 5 RAJ RIF with four Recoil-less guns (Rcls) (to destroy tanks and take out militants from concrete hide-outs) and two BMPs (armoured personnel carriers to carry infantry in tank battles) under the Deputy Bde Cdr to go along Road Manipai – Jaffna axis and link up with MAHAR firm base coy at Anaicottai. Briefing of the troops was carried out to prepare for any of the two eventualities. Half loads were quickly finalized.
At about 1230 hours on 18 Oct 1987, the Cdr informed that move via Mandaitivu island was off due to paucity of helicopters. Instead of one company moving along Road Manipai – Jaffna under Deputy Bde Cdr, the whole bn was tasked to link up under command of CO..
Battle of Manipai
Task:
The bn was tasked to move along axis Manipai – Jaffna and linking up with 8 MAHAR coy at Anaicottai which had been surrounded by LTTE and who were causing casualties by the hour, to progress its operations towards Jaffna and link up with 1 MARATHA LI, as early as possible.
Troops. Besides 5 RAJ RIF, two BMPs, two sections of engrs and two additional Rcls from other two bns (besides two of Bn) were allotted. Commander 41 Infantry Brigade along with his ‘R’ gp also desired to accompany the Bn, which was gracefully accepted by the CO..
Plan:
a) ‘A’ Coy to advance along main axis with one platoon each going off the axis and one platoon and section engineers moving along the main road. This was done to counter the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which enemy had laid on the road and exploded with remote control from about 80-100 yards off the road. ‘A’ coy was given two Rcls.
b) BMPs were to follow the leading coy. One platoon ex ‘C’ coy, the follow up coy was earmarked to protect the BMPs. (BMPs were without the communition and no night vision devices.) Bde Cdr moved in one of the BMP and suggested to CO to ride the other, which was politely refused as the bn was moving on foot and he preferred to be with men. CO with his ‘R’ group moved with ‘C’ Coy.
c) Bn HQ , ‘B’ and ‘D’ coys were to follow ‘C’ coy in that order
d) After link up with 8 MAHAR coy, the move to Jaffna Fort would continue. The van guard coy was to change after each encounter, otherwise it would continue till enemy opposition was faced.. Personnel from Intelligence and Surveillance Section were given to the coys for navigation.
e) Bn mortars were merged with the bde mortars and they were to give fire support from Uduvil. Support of two arty guns was available from Palaley, but no Forward Observation Officer (from Artillery to bring down fire on enemy) was allotted.
f) Deputy General Officer Commanding, 54 Infantry Division with staff was located at Uduvil to monitor the ops and provide divl sp, if and when required.
Conduct
The move started at 1330 hours with ‘A’ coy leading. All platoons of ‘A’ coy were given ANPRC (medium range radio) sets, as road was having built up area on both sides of the road. As the Coy Cdr was riding on BMP, he could not communicate with his platoons. The CO had to control their operations for about one hour before the coy cdr got down from the BMP and resumed his command. Manipai, about one km from Uduvil, was a strongly held locality of the enemy.
He had laid extensive IEDs and was covering the axis with automatic and small arms fire. When the centre platoon of ‘A’ coy reached Manipai, heavy volume of automatic fire coupled with blasting of IEDs halted their advance.
‘A’ coy suffered I JCO and 13 OR (other ranks- Jawans and NCOs) wounded within 30 minutes of contact.
The operation seemed to be a non starter due to heavy casualties and little progress. Firing by BMPs also did not ease up the matter. Small probes proved futile.
After gauging the situation for half an hour, the CO decided to out-flank the enemy defences in Manipai from SW and cut him off. ‘B’ coy followed by Bn HQ and ‘D’ coy comprised the maneuvering element.
This move proved to be the turning point of the ‘Link-up’ battle. Pressure on ‘A’ and ‘C’ Coys in contact with enemy at Manipai was reduced..
‘A’ and ‘C’ Coys met stiff resistance but ultimately cleared Manipai by 1530 hrs on 18 Oct 1987. Due to navigational error, the Cdr along with ‘A’ and ‘C’ coys instead of taking the Southern axis to Suthumalai continued advance towards Sandilipai.
Before last light when the column checked its present position, it was revealed that they were at Sandilipai. The column halted, took Westward turn and continued advance. After going about a kilometer, one of the BMPs went over an IED and was blown off.
The BMP was lifted approximately 30 feet in the air (incredible but true) because of large quantity of explosive (estimated to be between 200 and 250 kgs see photo of BMP after blast below) in it. Immediately the column cdr cleared the enemy, took diversion to SW and started advancing towards the Coastal Road.
Enroute help of locals as guide was taken. The advance was frequently interrupted by militants firing from the built up area. Going along Coastal Road, this column contacted 8 MAHAR coy at Mile 3 around 0245 hrs on 19 Oct 1987.
They were first asked by Division HQ to provide a secure helipad at Mile 3 for MAHAR coy’s casualties (14 of them) to be evacuated, but later on at about 0430 hrs on 19 Oct , were ordered to resume advance and effect the link up with Jaffna Fort.
The column progressed steadily and reached Navanturai (Mile 1.5) at 1030 hours on 19 Oct 87 despite severe opposition at three places enroute. At this juncture Major RK Chaturvedi, ‘C’ Coy Cdr moving after the two leading scouts was hit by a machine gun burst.
Despite getting wounded, he kept leading his coy till they had negotiated the crucial blind curve along the lagoon embankment. Thereafter due to excessive bleeding he breathed his last dying a soldier’s death. Two jawans lost their lives retrieving the body of their Coy Cdr.
The column moved ahead and advanced some distance. ‘A’ coy was being commanded by Major PS Sandhu and ‘C’ Coy had been taken over by Sub Madan Lal, after the death of the Coy Cdr. The column was by now left with very meagre ammunition. The personnel example of leadership, bravery and courage shown by Sub Madan Lal and Naik Nunda Ram of ‘C’ Coy and Sub Ranjit Singh Rathore and L/Nk Rajbir Singh of ‘A’ Coy saved the day for the Napiers Rifles.
On request, two BMPs from Jaffna Fort were rushed with ammunition and linked up at 1515 hrs. ‘A’ Coy Cdr was injured in the face while advancing between Navanturai and Jaffna Fort and had to be evacuated.
The link up with 1 MARATHA LI was effected at 1545 hrs on 19 Oct 1987. Thus Napiers Rifles became the first IPKF bn to effect the ‘link up’, achieving the first priority task of IPKF.
In this column one officer and four Other Ranks were killed and one officer, 2 JCOs and 10 Other Ranks were injured. On link up, the coys were given the task to hold area between Cremation Ground and Burial Ground ahead of CTO Tower along Hospital Road, which they occupied by 1700 hours on 19 Oct 1987.
Operations by Battalion Less two Coys
The other column consisting of ‘B’ and ‘D’ coys and Bn HQ bypassed Manipai from SW as described earlier. It encountered heavy opposition from defences on the right flank of Manipai, but by this move the pressure on ‘A’and ‘C” coys column was reduced as enemy had to readjust his defences and divide attention and forces.
15 LTTE militants were killed, including 10 with weapons. After bypassing Manipai, the column hit Manipai – Jaffna Road and waited for the other column to fetch up.
When they did not come for two hours and there was no radio link also with them, this column proceeded further informing Officiating General Officer Commanding who was at Uduvil monitoring the move.
At Suthumalai the column encountered yet another major enemy opposition. Possibly enemy from Manipai had withdrawn and was holding a lay back position. By a mix of outflanking move and charging through the enemy defences, the advance was resumed.
We contacted MAHAR coy in Anaicottai on radio set about 0230 hrs on 19 Oct 87. At this time enemy possibly came on column’s radio net and posing as Major Ganpathy, 8 MAHAR Coy Cdr guided the column (remember Bn was without maps) to an area where his Heavy Machine Gu was fixed.
It was quick reaction on the part of the leading Coy Cdr that the whole column escaped annihilation.
The column stopped near a Kulam (Pond) and waited for ‘D’ Coy which was still inside Thavadi village.
‘D’ Coy which took position inside a double storied house was surrounded by militants who started firing at them from all sides. At about 0400 hrs, the ‘D’ Coy Cdr was told to break contact and join the rest of the column. Due to daring action of Capt SS Chopra and presence of mind of Major BS Bisht, ‘D’ Coy Cdr, the coy not only broke contact but also inflicted casualties on the enemy.
At that time the column was approximately 800 yds from the 8 MAHAR coy, but it took five hours to link up with them, as the column encountered two major enemy opposition interposing between column and the MAHAR coy.in Coconut Grove.
After that the column’s advance to Jaffna Fort was resumed in the evening and linked up with the other column by first light on 20 Oct, not before it had an encounter with enemy, 300 yards short of Cremation Ground, with built up area on one side and lagoon on the other. Thus Link-up with Jaffna Fort was fully completed by Napiers Rifles.
In the ‘link up’ operation, battalion suffered one officer and 8 OR killed and 4 Officers, 4 JCOs and 33 OR injured.
36 LTTE cadres, including 3 self styled officers were killed.
Appreciation telegrams and letters started pouring in from Army chain of command and even from Raksha Mantri and the Prime Minister.
5 Offrs/JCOs/OR were recommended for MVC, including CO, 8 for Vir Chakra and 10 for Sena Medal, by the Bde Cdr and GOC 54 Infantry Division.
In the unit’s stay of 14 monthsin Sri Lanka , it operated in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Trincomalee Provinces of Sri Lanka, under four Bde nd three Divisions. It operated in the inaccessible jungles of Vavuniya, Mullaitivu and Alampil and in the thickly populated towns of Jaffna and Trincomalee.
It captured the maximum number of militants, modern and indigeneously manufactured arms, ammunition and explosive.
Total casualties suffered by the unit in OP PAWAN were 2 Offrs and 33 OR killed and 4 Offrs, 6 JCOs and 84 OR injured. We killed more than 195 LTTE cadres including 19 self styled officers. The Bn was conferred 23 gallantry awards – 1 MVC, 4 VrCs, 1 YSM, 5 SMs, 2 Mention-in-Dispatches, 5 COAS Commendation and 5 Army Cdr’s Commendation. I got SM (Gallantry) for link up ops and COAS Commendation for later ops.
Conclusion
It is often asked whether India’s involvement in Sri Lanka was justified.
It is not for the soldiers to question the wisdom of the democratic elected Govt of the day. Suffice to remember that we were given a legitimate task to perform, which we did with our utmost zeal and velour, despite many odds.
The handicaps included no maps, no transport, no RMO, no food for link up operations,( the Bn depended on the biscuits and juices which the airhostesses of Air India provided them on landing at Palaley from Lucknow), no FOO for even limited 2 gun arty support, mortars were out of range within first one hour of advance and BMPs without communication and night vision devices were like moving coffins.
Despite all this, the bn distinguished itself in all the tasks assigned to it. Trust of the Cdrs was so complete that every time a fresh task was assigned to the Bde,, it fell on the Napiers to accomplish it and hand it over to other units for safeguarding.
Even the GOC of 4 Inf Div called Napiers Rifles, only inf bn, alongwith the Para Cdo Bns, to surround Prabhakaran in the jungles of Vavuniya, in a later op.. The junior leadership as a whole and the coy cdrs in particular performed commendably well with professional skill. Unorthodox methods were adopted to defeat the militants in their own game.
